Title: Experimental evaluation of attacks on TESLA-secured time synchronization protocols
Authors: Teichel, Kristof, Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), Fachbereich 4.4, Zeit und Frequenz
Hildemeier, Gregor, Technische Universit├Ąt Braunschweig, Braunschweig, GERMANY
Contributors: HostingInstitution: Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB), ISNI: 0000 0001 2186 1887
Resource Type: Text / Article
Publisher: Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB)
Rights: Private use is allowed for non-profit purposes only.
Relationships: IsVariantFormOf: DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-04762-7_3
Dates: Available: 2019-04-11
Created: 2018-11
File: Download File (application/pdf) 454.38 kB (465281 Bytes)
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SHA256 Checksum: ec46b263e4286656267f03503e2a914694f4e3fe6057d54c315c57ff3820c364
Keywords: time synchronization protocols ; TESLA ; Authentication ; Experimental attack analysis ; ASTS ; TinySeRSync
Abstract: There is an increasingly relevant class of protocols that employ TESLA stream authentication to provide authenticity for one-way time synchronization. For such protocols, an interdependency between synchronization and security has been fount to theoretically enable attackers to render the security measures useless. We evaluate to what extent this attack works in practice. To this end, we use a tailor-made configurable testbed implementation to simulate behaviors of TESLA-protected one-way synchronization protocols in hostile networks. In particular, this lets us confirm vulnerabilities to the attac for two published protocols. TinySeRSync and ASTS. Our analysis also yields a set of countermeasures, with which in-development and future specifications can potentially use TESLA to successfully secure one-way time synchronization.
Citation: Teichel K., Hildermeier G. (2018) Experimental Evaluation of Attacks on TESLA-Secured Time Synchronization Protocols. In: Cremers C., Lehmann A. (eds) Security Standardisation Research. SSR 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11322. Springer, Cham doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-04762-7_3